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Cert to Md. ct. ZA~p~p'.--------------~------­
(Murphy, Smith, Levine, Orth; 
Digges, Eldridge, Cole, dissenting) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Does the installation of a pen register constitute a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? 
2. FACTS: Ms. McDonough was robbed. She gave police a descriptior. 
of the robber and of a 1975 Monte carlo that she had observed in her 
neighborhood shortly before the robbery. After the robbery, she began 
receiving threatening and obscene phon~ calls from a man who identified 
...... 
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himself as the person who robbed her. Police spotted a man who met the 
description of the robber driving a 1975 Monte Carlo. By tracing the 
license number of the vehicle, police learned that the car was registered 
in petr's name. At the ~equest of the police, the telephone company 
installed a pen register at its central offices to record the phone 
did not 
numbers of all calls from the telephone at petr's residence. Police I 
obtain a warrant or court order before installing the pen register. 
Thereafter, the pen register showed that a call was made to McDonough's 
home. Armed with a search warrant, police searched petr's home and 
found a notation of McDonough's telephone number next to petr's phone. 
McDonough identified petr as the robber at a line-up. At a pretrial 
suppression hearing, petr argued that evidence resulting from the 
installation of the pen register should be suppressed because absent a 
court order or search warrant, the use of a pen register constituted an 
illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The 
trial judge denied the motion, petr was found guilty of robbery and 
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Maryland court of Appeals af-
firmed. 
3. DECISION BELOW: The majority stated that under Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the question whether installation of a 
pen register requires compliance with the Fourth Amendment depends on 
"whether a telephone subscriber has a constitutionally protected expec-
tation that the numbers which he dials will remain private." The court 
held that a subscriber does not have a constitutionally protected ex-
- 3 -
pectation of privacy with respect to the numbers dialed for two reasons. 
----..--... v 
every subscriber realizes that the phone company keeps records 
of toll calls and there seems no valid distinction between the expec-
tations associated with local calls and toll calls because most sub-
scribers probably have no "real knowledge" of +-he geographic boundaries 
on their "local call" zone. all telephone subscribers use 
equipment owned by a third party and therefore it is unreasonable to 
assume that the fact of one's call passing through the system will remain 
a total secret from the phone company. While the Fourth Amendment 
h 
. v-- . 
protects t e content of conversat1ons, pen reg1sters do not reveal that 
content and they are regularly used by the phone company without a court 
order "for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud 
and preventing violations of the law." United States v. New York Tel., 
434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977). The court found support for its conclusion~ 
in cases dealing with the attachment of transmitters to informants, 
inspection of bank deposit slips turned over to the , bank, use of beepers, 
and reading of mail covers, all of which either this Court or other 
courts have held do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The majority 
cited several cases in which courts have held that telephone subscribers 
have no reasonable expectation that records of their calls will not be 
made. See, ~· Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 555 F.2d 254 
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1975). 
believe 
The dissenters / that the installation of a pen register constitutE 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. While a subscriber 
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may expect that completed long distance ~alls will be recorded, the 
subscriber does not expect that the phone company will monitor the 
telephone numbers of local calls. Contrary to the majority's view, 
subscribers are aware of their "local ·call" zone because, at least in 
Maryland, they must dial the prefix "1" before they can make a call 
beyond that zone. "The defendant, by the simple act of dialing local 
numbers·, did not reasonably intend to reveal information7 he merely 
made use of machinery in particular ways which, without the police in-
trusion, would have remained fully private." They found the analogy to 
the transmitter-on-informer and bank deposit slip cases unpersuasive 
because the phone company is not a "party" to telephone conversations in 
parties to the conversations or ba~k transactions. 
the same sense as the informer and bank are/ Mail cover cases also are 
distinguishable since anything written on the outside of an envelope 
is placed in the plain view of the public. Finally, the dissenters noted 
that several courts have held that the installation of pen registers is 
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements. See, ~, Southwestern Bell 
Tel. v. United States, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
u.s. (1918); New York Tel. v. United States, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 149 (1977)7 United States v. Illinois Bell 
Tel., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976)7 United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975). 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr simply repeats the arguments of the dissenter£ 
He claims that there is a split among the lower courts on this question 
------ j 
as evidenced by the cases relied on by the majority and dissenters and 
' ' 
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that the court should grant cert in thi~ case to resolve the conflict. 
Finally, he argues that the following statement by Mr. Justice Powell, 
concurring and dissenting, in United States v. Giordano, 416 u.s. 505, 
553-54 (1974) "should be dispositive of this issue": 
"Because a pen register is not subject to the 
provisions of Title III, the permissibility of 
its use by law enforcement authorities depends 
entirely on compliance with the constitutional 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment." 
L r:=P 
5. DISCUSSION: This court has not yet determined whether pen 
register surveillance is subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amend -
V 
ment. The question was specifically reserved in United States v. New Yo ~ 
Tel., 434 u.s. 159, 165 n. 7 (1977). And in a footnote following the 
above-quoted statement by Mr. Justice Powell in Giordano, he stated that 
he did not have to address the question whether the use of a pen registe l 
constitutes a search because, assuming the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment, its requirements were satisfied in that case. 416 u.s. at 
554 n. 4. The claimed split in the circuits on this question may be 
c 
more apparent than real. The court in John specifically declined to 
~,----------------~------~~ -~ 
decide whether the use of pen registers constitutes a search. None of 
the o~r case~ __ re~~ly addressed_ the qu~stion whether use of the device 
is a search~ instead, they simply quoted the_pt~e~ent f~Mr. Justice 
~- - - -- --- -------
~owell __ ~.!:!_ied on by petr and __9SS~-~e__:l that the Fourth Amendment governs 
installation of pen registers, apparently without recognizing that Mr. 
c::.....6 
Justice Powell declined to decide that question. In any event, in all 
of the cases relied on by the dissenters, the Government had secured a 
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court order or warrant before installing the pen register. Hodge, supra, 
relied on by the majority, was a § 1983 action against the telephone 
company in which the CA 9 held that, assuming state action, the expecta-
tion of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment attaches to the content 
a 
of/telephone conversation and not to the fact that the conversation took 
place. In Clegg, supra, the CA 5 stated in dicta that the overnment's 
use of a pen register would not be subject to the Fourth Amendment's 
conflict 
requirements. Thus, there is no clear / in the "holdings" of the cases 
seem 
cited, although the predilections of the courts cited/ obvious and 
those predispositions do differ. 
Should the court be interested in addressing this issue, despite 
the lack of a clear conflict below, this case may be a good candidate. 
The opinions below are well researched and thoughtful, and the factual 
setting of this case is uncomplicated and squarely serves up the issue. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ----
No. 78-5374 
Michael Lee Smith, Petitioner, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Court of Appeals of 
State of Maryland. Maryland. 
[June -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the installatiou 
and use of a pen register 1 constitutes a "search" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment," made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteeuth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
I 
On March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Md., Patricia McDonough 
was robbed. She gave the police a description of the robber 
and of a 1975 Monte Carlo automobile she had observed near 
the scene of the crime. Tr. 66- 68. After the robbery, 
1 "A pen register is a mechanical device that rerords the numbers dialed 
on a telephone by monitoring the electrira1 impulses cauf:ed whrn the dial 
on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications 
and does not indicate whet her calls are actually complrted." United 
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n . 1 (1977). A pen rrg-
i ~trr iH "usually in;,; ta11Pd at a crntntl telephone facility [and] record;,; on 
a paper tape all numbers dialed from rnle] line" to which it i:l attached. 
United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 549 n . 1 (1974) (opinion con-
curring in part and di<'Scnting in part) . Sre ~1l so United States v. New 
York Tel. Co., 434 U. S., a.t 162. 
2 "The right of the people to be ~Pcure in their persons, house:-<, papPrs, 
and pffectH, ngain::<t unreasonable 8earches and ~Pizures, :;hall not be viO-
latf'd, and no Warrant~ shall i~~ue, hut upon probable cam;e, ~upported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particular!~ · describing the place to be ~parched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. Canst., Amdt. 4 
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McDonough began receiving threatening and obscene phone 
calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. On one 
occasion , the caller asked that she step out on her front porch; 
she did so, and saw the 1975 Monte Carlo she had earlier de-
scribed to police moving slowly past her home. I d., at 70. 
On March 16, police spotted a man who met McDonough's 
description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in her neighborhood. 
!d. , at 71-72. By tracing the license plate number, police 
learned that the car was registered in the name of petitioner, 
Michael Lee Smith. !d., at 72. 
The next day, the telephone company, at police request, in-
stalled a pen register at its central offices to record the num-
bers dialed from the telephone at petitioner's home. I d., at 
73, 75. Police did not get a warrant or court order before 
having the pen register installed. The register revealed that 
on March 17 a call was placed from petitioner's home to 
McDonough's phone. !d. , at 74. On the basis of this and 
other evidence, police obtained a warrant to search petitioner's 
residence. I d., at 75. The search revealed that a page in 
petitioner's phone book was turned down to the name and 
number of Patricia McDonough; the phone book was seized. 
Ibid. Petitioner was arrested , and a six-man line-up was held 
on March 19. McDonough identified petitioner as the man 
who had robbed her. !d., at 70-71. 
Petitioner was indicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore 
for robbery. By pretrial motion, he sought to suppress "all 
fruits derived from the pen register" on the ground that police 
had failed to secure a warrant prior to its installation. Rec-
ord 14; Tr. 54- 56. The trial court denied the suppression 
motion , holding that the warrantless installation of the pen 
register did not violate the Fourth Amendment. I d., at 63. 
Petitioner then waived a jury, and the case was submitted to 
the court on an agreed statement of facts. !d. , at 65- 66. 
The pen register tape (evidencing the fact that a phone call 
had been made from petitiouer's phone to McDonough's. 
' J 
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phone) and the phone book seized in the search of petitioner's 
residence were admitted into evidence against him. I d., at 
74-76. Petitioner was convicted, id., at 78, and was sen-
tenced to six years. He appealed to the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued 
a writ of certiorari to the intermediate court in advance of its 
decision in order to consider whether the pen register evidence 
had been properly admitted at petitioner's trial. 283 Md. 
156, 160, 389 A. 2d 858, 860 (1978). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, 
holding that "there is no constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a telephone 
system and hence no search within the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated by the use of a pen register installed at the central 
offices of the telephone company." ld., at 173, 389 A. 2d, at 
867. Because there was no "search," the court concluded, no 
warrant was needed. Three judges dissented, expressing the 
view that individuals do have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy regarding the phone numbers they dial from their 
homes; that the installation of a pen register thus constitutes 
a "search"; and that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, 
the failure of police to secure a warrant mandated that the 
pen register evidence here be excluded. !d., at 174, 178, 389 
A. 2d, at 868, 870. Certiorari was granted in order to resolve 
indications of conflict in the decided cases as to the restric-
tions imposed by the Fourth Amendment on the use of pen 
registers.3 - U. S. - (1978). 
3 See Application of the United States for an Order, Etc., 546 F . 2d 243, 
245 (CAS 1976), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1008 (1978) ; Application of U. S. 
in Matter of Order, Etc ., 5:~8 F . 2d 956, 959-960 (CA2 1976), rev 'd on 
other grounds s'Ub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co .. 434 U. S. 
159 (1977) ; United States v. Falcone, 505 F . 2d 478, 482, and n. 21 (CA3 
1974), cert . denied, 420 U. S. 955 (1975), Hodge v. MO'Untain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co ., 555 F. 2d 254,256 (CMl 1977). id. , at 266 (concurring; opinion) , 
and United States v. ('legg, 500 F . 2d 605, 610 (CA5 1975) . In previous 
decision:;, this Court has not found it nere~sa.ry to consider whether '·pen 
4 
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A 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "{t"lhe right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." In deter-
mining whether a particular form of government-initiated 
electronic surveillance is a "search" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment,' our lodestar is Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347 (1967). In Katz, Government agents had in-
tercepted the contents of a telephone conversation by attach~ 
ing an electronic listening device to the outside of a public 
phone booth. The Court rejected the argument that a 
"search" can occur only when there has been a "physical in-
trusion" into a "constitutionally protected area," noting that 
the Fourth Amendment "protects people. not places." I d., 
at 351-353. Because the Government's monitoring of Katz' 
conversation "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably 
relied while using the telephone booth," the Court held that 
it "constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment." !d., at 353. 
Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that 
the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether 
the person invoking its protection can claim a "justifiable," a 
"reasonable." or a "legitimate expectation of privacy" that 
has been invaded by government action. E. g., Rakas v .. 
register survrillance [is] subject. to the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment." United States v. New York Tel. Co .. 434 U.S., at 165 n. 7. See 
United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S., at 554 n. 4 (opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
4 In this case, the pen rrgio;ter was installed, and the numbt>rs dialrd 
wrre rrcorded, by thr telephonr rompany. Tr. 73-74. The telephone 
company, however, acted at police reque~t. !d., at 73, 75. In view of 
thi;;, rrspondrnt. appears to concedr that. the comr1any is to bP deemed an 
"agent" of the police for purposE's of this rasP, so as to render the installa-
tion and u~e of the pen register "state action" under the Fomth and Four-
teenth Amendmrnts. Wr may lM:>umr that "state action" wao; pre>:Pnt herP, 
78-537 4-0PINION• 
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Illinois,- U. S. -, -, and n. 12 (1978); id., at-,-
(concurring opinion); id., at -, (dissenting opinion); 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7 (1977); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 
U. S. 322, 335-336 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U. S. 
745, 752 (1971); (plurality opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte, 
392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 
( 1968). This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in 
his Katz concurrence, embraces two discrete questions. The 
first is whether the individual, by this conduct, has "exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," 389 U. S., at 
361-whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individ-
ual has shown that "he seeks to preserve [something] as pri-
vate." Id., at 351. The secoud question is whether the 
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that 
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,' " id., at 361-
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's 
expectation, viewed objectively, is "justifiabl[e]" under the 
circumstances. !d., at 353. See Rakas v. Illinois,- U. S., 
at- n. 12, id., at- (concurring opinion); United States v. 
White, 401 U. S., at 752 (plurality opinion). 
B 
In applying the Katz analysis to this case, it is important 
to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activ-
ity that is challenged. The activity here took the form of 
installing and using a pen register. Since the pen register 
was installed on telephone company property at the telephone 
company's central offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim 
that his "property"' was invaded or that police intruded into 
e. "constitutionally protected area." Petitioner's claim, 
rather, is that, notwithstanding the absence of a trespass, the 
State, as did the Government in Katz, infringed a "legitimate 
expectation of privacy" petitioner held. Yet a pen register 
differs significantly from the listening device employed in 
78-537 4-0PINION 
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Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of commu-
nications. This Court recently noted: 
"Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even deter-
mine from the use of a pen register whether a communi-
cation existed. These devices do not hear sound. They 
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been 
dialed-a means of establishing communication. Neither 
the purport of any communication between the caller and 
the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the 
call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers." 
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U. S., at 167. 
Given a pen register's limited capabilities, therefore, peti-
tioner's argument that its installation and use constituted a 
"search" necessarily rests upon a claim that he had a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy" regarding the numbers he dialed 
on his phone. 
This claim. must be rejected. First, we doubt that people 
in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the 
numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 
"convey" phone numbers to the telephone company, since it 
is through telephone company switching equipment that their 
calls are completed. All subscribers reaiize, moreover, that 
the phone cq>mpany has facilities for making permanent rec-
ords of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-
distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact. pen 
registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone 
companies "for the purposes of checking billing operations, 
detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law." United 
States v. 1Yew York Tel. Co., 434 U. S., at 174-175. Elec-
tronic equipment is used, uot only to keep billing records of 
toll calls, but "to keep a record of all calls dialed from a tele-
phone which is subject to a special rate structure." Hodge v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F. 2d 254, 266 (CA9 
1977) (concurring opinion). Pen registers are regularly em-
ployed "to determine whether a home phone is being used to 
78-5374-0PINlON 
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conduct a business, to check for a defective dial, or to check 
for overbilling." Note, The Legal Constraints upon the Use 
of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1028, 1029 (1975) (footnotes omitted). Although 
most people may be oblivious to a pen register's esoteric func-
tions, they presumably have some awareness of one common 
use: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying 
or obscene calls. See, e. g., Von Lusch v. C & P Tel. Co., 457 
F. Supp. 815, 816 (Md. 1978); Note, 60 Cornell L. Rev., at 
1029-1030, n. 11; Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 Drake L. 
Rev. 108, 110-111 (1979). Most phone books tell subscribers, 
on a page entitled "Consumer Information," that the com-
pany "can frequently help in identifying to the authorities 
the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls." E. g., Bal-
timore Telephone Directory 21 (1978); District of Columbia 
Telephone Directory 13 ( 1978). Telephone users, in sum, 
typically know that they must convey numerical information 
to the phone company; that the phone company has fa,cilities 
for recording this information; and that the phone company 
does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate 
business purposes. Although subjective expectations cannot 
be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that tele-
phone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any gen-
eral expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret. 
Petitioner argues, however, that, whatever the expectations 
of telephone users in general, he demonstrated an expectation 
of privacy by his own conduct here, since he "us[ed] the tele-
phone in his house to the exclusion of all others." Brief for 
Petitioner 6 (emphasis added). But the site of the call is 
immaterial for purposes of analysis in this case. Although 
petitioner's conduct may have been calculated to keep the 
contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and 
could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the 
number he dialed. Regardless of his location, petitioner had 
to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely 
78-537 4-0PINION 
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the same way if he wished to complete his call. The fact 
that he dialE>d the number on his home phone rather than on 
some other phone could make no conceivable difference, nor 
could any subscriber rationally think that it would. 
Second, even if petitioner did harbor some subjective ex-
pectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain 
private, this expectation is not "one that society is prepared 
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" This Cohrt consistently has 
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. E. g., 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S., at 442-444; Couch v. 
United States, 409 U. S., at 335-336; United States v. White, 
401 U. S., at 752 (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U. S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 
427 (1963). In Miller, for example, the Court held that a 
bank depositor has no "legitimate 'expectation of privacy' " 
in financial information "voluntarily conveyed to ... banks 
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of busi-
ness." 425 U. S., at 442. The Court explained: 
"The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to the Government. . . . This Court has held re-
peatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party 
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even 
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it 
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed." I d., at 
443. 
Because the depositor "assumed the risk" of disclosure, the 
Court held that it would be unreasonable for him to expect 
his financial records to n~main private. 
This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate 
expectation of privacy here. When he used his phone, peti-
tioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the 
L 
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telephone company and "exposed" that information to its 
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, 
petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to 
police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that 
processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of 
the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls 
for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had placed 
his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate 
expectation of privacy. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3--5, 11-12, 32. We 
are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result 
is required because the telephone company has decided to 
automate. 
Petitioner argues, however. that automatic switching equip~ 
ment differs from a live operator in one pertinent respect. 
An operator, in theory at least, is capable of remembering 
every number that is conveyed to him by callers. Electronic 
equipment, by contrast, can "remember" only those numbers 
it is programmed to record, and telephone companies, in view 
of their present billing practices, usually do not record local 
calls. Since petitioner, in calling McDonough, was making a 
local call, his expectation of privacy as to her number, on this 
theory, would be "legitimate." 
This argument does not withstand scrutiny. The fortuity 
of whether or not the phone company in fact elects to make a 
quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does 
not, in our view, make any constitutional differences. Re-
gardless of the phone company's election, petitioner volun-
tarily conveyed to it information that it had facilities for 
recording and that it was free to record. In these circum-
stances, petitioner assumed the risk that the information 
would be divulged to police. Under petitioner's theory, 
Fourth Amendment protection would exist, or not, depending 
on how the telephone company chose to define local-dialing 
zones, and depending on how it chose to bill its customers for 
local calls. Calls placed across town, or dialed directly, would 
78-537 4-0PINION 
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be protected; calls placed across the river, or dialed with op~ 
erator assistance, might not be. We are not inclined to make 
a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially in circum-
stances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be 
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation. 
We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability 
entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone 
numbers he dialed, and that. even if he did, his expectation 
was not "legitimate." The installation and use of a pen reg-
ister. consequently, was not a "search," and no warrant was 
required. The judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals 
is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
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